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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
-v-

:

LELAND FACER and ROBERT
W. SHIELDS,

Case No.
14251

:

Defendants-Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Leland Jack Facer, appeals
from a conviction of the crime of intentionally
employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
entered against him in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of intentionally
employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
by a jury and sentenced to serve in the Utah State
Prison for a term of three (3) years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court
affirming the verdict and judgment rendered by
the jury at the trial.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the latter half of 1972 the appellant
commenced a series of transactions designed to promote
trading and create market activity in the stock of
Great Northern Corporation (T. 74, 155, 223, 228,
294-296).

The appellantBs interest in Great

Northern began during the summer when he met with the
corporation^ president to discuss the corporation
and its assets (T. 292) • Thereafter,, trading in
the corporation's stock began to significantly
increase due to the appellant's own trading and
his encouragement of others to trade in the stock
of the corporation (T. 68, 294, 328, 425-426).
Moreover, at the end of August one of the appellant's
associates, Robert Shields, procured a loan of
$35,000 for the appellant in order to raise trading
money (T. 329). The appellant1s sonfs home was used
as security for the loan and stock in Great Northern
was pledged on the loan on the home (T. 330, 332).
A month later the appellant received another 3oan
from Shields for $25,000 (T. 336). The stock of
Great Northern was subsequently split forward on
a five-for-one basis and again on a three-for-one
basis (T. 68, 347-50).

Furthermore, rumors were

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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heard concerning possible mergers of Great Northern.
A merger was finally consummated between Great
Northern and American International Travel Services
Company (T, 334-38/ 444). Based upon representations by the appellant. Shields invested $40,000
in the stock of AIT.

This money was taken by the

appellant even though AIT was an inactive company
of which the only assets were old mining claims
(T. 339, 458, 459, 462).
The appellant executed the sales and
purchases of stock by means of nominee accounts and
so-called "wash trades" or "float trades" (T. 86,.
116, 200-202, 217). Nominees are persons who own
accounts in various brokerage houses and normally
charge a commission for their use.

The purpose of

using a nominee account is to hide the identity of
the seller or buyer (T. 16). The appellant requested
and received permission to use Shield's account at
three brokerage houses which dealt in the appellant's
stock (T. 80, 341, 345). Shields purchased the stock
for the appellant by receiving checks from the
appellant's wife (T. 341, 344). The appellant and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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another associate also requested and received
permission to use various other nominee accounts
(T. 181, 420, 423). The appellant used nominee
accounts whose owners had no knowledge of their
account's usage by the appellant (Tc 308-309, 315,
317, 321, 323).
The procedures used in conducting a "wash
trade" or "float trade" consisted of two simultaneous transactions.

First, the appellant sold

his stock to Continental Securities, Inc., as
part of a cash trade, allowing him to receive payment immediately upon his payment of a double commission (T. 202). Thus, the appellant avoided the
customary seven day waiting period. Second, at
the same time the appellant sold his stock to
Continental, he purchased the same stock through
a directed trade from another brokerage house
(T. 92, 182) * However, when the appellant purchased
the stock he took advantage of the seven day payment
rule and was not required to pay for the stock until
one week after the purchase.

Continental transferred

the stock to the other brokerage house for consideration, which was immediately paid to the appellant.
Thus, in essence the appellant retained ownership
of the stock as well as an interest free loan
for seven days, all for the price of a double
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

commission.

Owners and employees of the brokerage

houses were not aware that the appellant was on
both ends of the transaction nor were they aware
of the terms of payment or that payment was made
on checks not written by the owners of the nominee
accounts(T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81, 82, 110, 233).
The owner of one brokerage house testified that he
did not allow float trades if he knew they were
going on (T. 55). In addition, Shields, who
participated in the actual selling and buying of
securities for the appellant, testified that he
did not know what the appellant was doing. (T. 346) .
The market activity created by the appellant
continued until February, 1973, when, because of
the significant increase in trading of Great
Northern stock and the lack of information concerning the enterprise, the Securities and Exchange
Commission suspended trading in the stock for ten
days.

Thereafter, a number of transactions occurred

in the stock of Great Northern, Silver Gull Corporation, and West Am Corporation.

However, the market

for the stocks deteriorated rapidly (T.71, 91,
158, 179, 388, 402, 413). During March,
1973, all of the checks written by the appellant's wife to pay for the purchased securities
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were not covered by sufficient funds (T. 387, 388,
443).

The brokerage houses became owners of stock

substantially lessened in value and thus collectively
suffered losses in excess of $150,000 (T. Doc. 6)•
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE ELEMENT OF RELIANCE
BECAUSE RELIANCE IS NOT AN ELEMENT IN A CRIMINAL
SECURITIES FRAUD PROSECUTION.
It is a well settled common law standard,
followed by the Utah Supreme Court, that the trial
court is not obliged to give a requested instruction unless it accurately states the law.

State

v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498 P.2d 357, 359 (1972).
This principle applies with equal force to
instructions in prosecutions for the violation
of statutes regulating securities.

Respondent

contends that by refusing to instruct the jury with
respect to reliance the trial court accurately
stated the law.
Appellant was convicted of intentionally
employing a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
under Utah Code A m u § 61-1-1 (1953), which provides:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"It is unlawful for any person,
in connection with the offer, sale,
or purchase of any security, directly
or indirectly,
(1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances
under which they are made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would
operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person."
This statute was adopted as part of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act which was modeled after Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C;§ 77q(a), and § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.106-5, of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

In accordance

with previous decisions of this Court in securities
fraud cases, and because the present case appears
to be a case of first impression, respondent believes
that the Utah statute is sufficiently identical
with the corresponding provisions of the Uniform
Securities Act, Securities Act of 19 33, and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that it regards adjudications on those statutes as persuasive.

S & F Supply

Company v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (1974).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Since the statutory prohibition against
securities fraud is designed to protect investors
from deceptive practices, it is not surprising that
the common law tort of deceit has provided the
foundation for developing the compensatory aspects
of the private right of action under Rule 10b-5.
As one of the elements of the common law action for
deceit, Professor Prosser lists justifiable reliance
by the plaintiff•

Wo Prosser, Handbook of The Law

of Torts, § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).

How-

ever, it has consistently been held in criminal
prosecutions that:
"It is not necessary to
prove each of the elements of common
law fraud or deceit to obtain a
criminal conviction under Section
17(a)." 3 Loss, Securities Regulation
1430-44; 6 Loss 3526-55 (2d ed. 1961).
Moreover, as the author of the leading law review
article on criminal prosecutions under the federal
securities laws has stated:
"Consequently, a defrauded purchaser
need not be located, since the
Government does not have to establish
that a victim actually was deceived,
suffered actual loss, or otherwise
relied upon the defendant's conduct.
A mere offer made in a fraudulent
manner violates the statute."
39 George Washington Law Review 901,
926 (1971).
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Respondent contends that the appellant's mere offer,
sale and purchase of securites was made in a fraudulent manner and therefore violated the Utah statute,
regardless of whether or not the victims actually
relied on the scheme to defraud.
Several well-reasoned federal cases have
discussed the issue of reliance in a criminal
prosecution.

In United States v. Amick/ 439 F.2d

351 (7th Cir. 19 71) , a stock salesman for a corporation knowingly made misrepresentations to
purchasers which were untrue, material, and intended
to persuade

prospective purchasers.

Under the

charge of violating Section 17(a), he contended
that the government failed to prove that the
purchasers relied on the untrue statements and
the evidence showed that the purchasers had not
testified that
his assertions.

they either believed or relied on
The court affirmed the appellant1s

conviction and held:
"Courts have said that in
prosecutions under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a),
at least where a fraudulent scheme
was employed, it is unnecessary to
prove that a victim parted with
money or property in reliance upon
misrepresentations.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Considering the language
of the three subdivisions of 77
q(a), it is clear that the activity
proscribed by subdivisions (1) and
(3) need not be successful to be
unlawful, and reliance by a victim need
not be proved . . . we conclude that
proof of any degree of reliance was
not required here*" 439 F.2d at 366.
In Estep v. United States, 223 F.2d 19 (5th Cir* 1965),
cert, denied 350 U.S. 863, 76 S.Ct. 105, 100 L.Ed.
765, the appellant was convicted of violating § 17(a)
on the grounds that he intentionally induced persons to purchase stock subscriptions of a corporation about to market a fuelless,
motor.

self-energizing

The governments instruction to the jury

charged in substance that it was not essential that
the government prove that all of the investors
in the company were defrauded, "but it is sufficient if you so find that one or more of such
investors were defrauded*"

In response to the

appellant's objection to the instruction, the
court on appeal held that:
"The charge placed a greater
burden on the government than was
actually required, since it is not
necessary that the government prove
that anyone was actually defrauded
in order to show a violation of
the statutes under which defendant
was indicted." 223 F.2d at 22*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Bobbroff v. United States, 202 F.2d 389 (9th Cir.
1953), appellant was convicted of violating § 17(a)
by intentionally making false statements which were
designed to encourage existing shareholders of a
lawnmower manufacturer to purchase additional stock.
The appellant contended that to constitute a crime
each of the shareholders must have been deceived
by the fraudulent offer or attempted fraud.
The argument was grounded on the common law cases
where fraud was charged against a defendant causing
damage to a plaintiff where the plaintiff had not
shown that the defendant actually deceived him to
to his disadvantage.

As in the present case, the

appellant in Bobbroff, supra, cited no criminal
cases which held that reliance was an essential
element of a criminal action.
that the mere

The court held

mailing of letters containing

such misrepresentations constituted violations
of the act even though the recipients were not
deceived by the misrepresentations.

See also

United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 799
(5th Cir. 1975); Farrell v. United States, 321 F.2d
409, 419 (9th Cir. 1963), cert, denied 375 U.S. 992,
84 S.Ct. 631, 11 L.Ed.2d 478; Frank v. United States,
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220 F.2d 559, 563 (10th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Bogy, 16 F.Supp. 407 (W.D. Tenn. 1936), aff'do
96 F.2d 734 (6th Cir* 1938), cert, denied 305 U.S.
608, 59 S.Ct. 68, 83 L.Ed. 387; Butler v. United
States, 53 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1931); United States
v. Schaefer, 299 F,2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1962), Hasting's
dissent; Llanos v. United States, 205 F.2d 852, 854
(9th Cir. 1953); and United States v. Jones, 380 F.
Supp. 343, 345 (D.N.J* 1974).
The above authorities are important because
they differentiate between the fraud of common law
on the one hand and the course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser of
securities, or the sale by means of making an untrue
statement of any material fact, or the omission
of any material fact on the other hand.

The

appellants conduct in the present case was circumscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(1) (1953), which
specifically prohibits the employment of a device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud.

The rule in Amick,

supra, and in Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage
Exchange v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1959),
although an injunction action, held that the fraud
known to common law, which required reliance was not the fraud

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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required to constitute a violation of § 17(a)(1)
of the Securities Act of 19 33.

Clearly, under the

federal standard the trial court was correct in
refusing the appellant's reliance instruction*
As is the situation in Utah, few state
courts have had the opportunity to deal with this
issue.

However, the issue was considered in

Birchfield v. State of Texas, 401 S.W.2d 825, 828
(Crim. App. 1966), where the appellant was convicted under a penal statute which provided that
any person "engaged in any fraud or fraudulent
practice in the sale, offering for sale or delivery
of, invitation of offers, or dealing in any other
manner in any security or securities shall be deemed
guilty of a felony . . ."

The court noted the dis-

tinction between reliance in criminal and civil
securities fraud cases with the following;
"In our original opinion we
held the indictment and charge defective
because they failed to allege and
instruct the jury that the injured party
relied upon the fraudulent representations
made by appellant. In support of such
holding we cited several civil cases
which hold that one of the essential
elements of fraud is that the injured
party relied upon the fraudulent
representation. We have now concluded
that we were in error.
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"Since reliance upon the fraudulent
representation would not be an essential
element of an offer for sale, or invitation of offers, or dealing in any other
manner in any security, we cannot bring
ourselves to conclude that it was the
intention of the legislature to require
one quantum of proof where an offer
to sell was made*, This is especially
true where the several different ways
a violation of the statute may be
committed are embodied in the same
paragraph of the statute. Since
reliance need not be proven, it need
not be alleged." 401 S.W.2d. at 828.
Appellant cites S & F Supply Company v. Hunter,
supra, for the proposition that a reliance instruction should have been given in the present case.
However, that case is distinguishable on the
grounds that it was not a criminal action, but
rather a civil action brought by the sellers of
stock against the buyer for breach of contract
where the buyer counterclaimed for rescission of
the contract.

In addition, the buyer1s argument

for rescission was not premised on Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1 (1953), but rather on Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-22(1) (b) (1953) , which specifically provided that a buyer who did not know of the untruth
or omission had a private right of action against
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the seller to recover the consideration paid for
the security.

Under the statute this Court held

that a buyer could not blindly purchase stock
but must show his reliance as a basis for avoiding
his contract.

Clearly, by holding that a reliance

instruction is unnecessary in a criminal action
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1) (1953)f this Court
would not be required to deviate from the standard
outlined in S & F Supply Company.
Respondent also contends that even in
civil cases the nature of the reliance requirement
has been altered.

The greatest step in this

direction occurred in 1972 with the Supreme Court's
decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 1456# 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972).
In Affiliated Ute, a bank and its employees made
purchases from a group of unsophisticated securities
holders without disclosing the higher price at
which the securities were being traded in a secondary
market fostered by the bank.

There was no positive

proof that the plaintiffs had relied upon the
defendant's fraudulent conduct in deciding to sell
their securities.

The Supreme Court held that:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"[U]nder the circumstances of
this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof
of reliance is not a prerequsite to
recovery• All that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important
in the making of this decision,"
406 U.S. at 153-154.
The Tenth Circuit, citing Affiliated Ute, has also
held that "there is no need to prove the elements
of common law fraud, including positive proof
of reliance."

Resort Car Rental V. Ruwart Chevrolet,

519 P.2d 317, 321 (10th Cir. 1975).

See also

88 Harvard Law Review 584 (19 75) and 1973 Utah Law
Review 119.
Finally, respondent contends that even
if this Court finds that a reliance instruction
may be applicable in certain criminal securities
fraud cases, such an instruction was not necessary
in the present case and its absence was not of
sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal.

As pointed

out in other sections of respondent's brief, many of
the victims in the present case were unaware that
the appellant was on both sides of the transactions
and that they were part of appellant's unlawful
scheme (T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81. 82, 110, 233, 241).
For these reasons appellant1s argument concerning
reliance should be rejected.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFENSE OF UNCLEAN
HANDS BECAUSE THE DEFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE IN A
CRIMINAL SECURITIES FRAUD PROSECUTION.
The frequently stated maxim that "he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands"
is an ancient and favorite precept of the equity
court.

However, the general principle is well

settled that equity has no jurisdiction in criminal
matters which do not affect property.

The prose-

cution of crimes is confided to the criminal courts,
and the remedy by indictment and prosecution is
deemed to be adequate.

This Court has aLso stated

that the clean hands doctrine is a fundamental
principle of equity jurisprudence, but is not,
in its application so much an absolute rule to
be followed by the courts as it is a guide for
determining whether, in a suit between two or more
wrongdoers, relief should be granted.

Park v.

Jameson, 12 Utah 2d 141, 364 P.2d 1 (1961) (Emphasis
added.)
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In the present case it cannot be contended
that the State of Utah, as plaintiff, had unclean
hands in the prosecution of the case.

In Deseret

Apartments v. United States, 250 F.2d 457 (10th
Cir. 1957), where the United States brought an
action against a Utah apartment corporation to
foreclose a real estate and chattel mortgage, the
court held that unless the government did something
which in good conscience it should not have done,
or failed to do something fair dealing required it
to do, it came into court with clean hands.
In addition to the arguments that the
defense of unclean hands is not available in a
criminal prosecution, or against the State of Utah,
many courts have held that the defense is not
available in a private stock fraud action.

Thus,

in Texas Continental Life Insurance Company v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962), where an
ultimate buyer of municipal bonds brought a civil
action for conspiracy to violate Sections 17(a),
10(b), and Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws
against the original buyer of such bonds, the court
held that unclean hands was no defense to the claim
of the ultimate buyer.
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Moreover, in private stock fraud suits
where the defense has been recognized it is generally
held that the trial court has wide discretion in
its application.

For example, in Wolf v. Frank,

477 F.2d 467, rehearing denied 478 F.2d 1403 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 975. 94 S.Ct.
287, 38 L.Ed.2d 218, rehearing denied 414 IKS.
1104, 94 S.Ct. 739, 38 L.Ed.2d 860, where the
plaintiffs were awarded individual and derivative
relief from defendants for violations of Sections
17(a), 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the court held that
while the defense of unclean hands was available in
the Fifth Circuit, its application rested within
the sound discretion of the trial court.

The court

further held that the test of whether the defense
was allowed should be determined by ascertaining
whether the application or non-application of the
defense would better promote the objectives of
the securities laws

by increasing the protection

afforded the investing public.

477 F.2d at 474.

Also, in Cartier v. Dutton, 45 FRD 278, '64 - '66, CCH Fed*
Sec. L. Rep. (Transfer Binder)~1[ 91, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
where the defendant alleged a champertous agreement
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to bring the lawsuit and to harass the defendant
in order to force him to sell his stock to persons
who inspired and were controlling the suit, the
court sustained the defense of unclean hands against
a motion to dismiss or strike the defense and held
that the defense was permitted not to aid the one
asserting it but, rather, on the grounds of public
policy and to protect the dignity of the Court,
However, even if this Court finds that the
doctrine of unclean hands may be applicable in
a criminal securities fraud prosecution, it is
nevertheless inapplicable in the present case for
two reasons.

First, it seems patently absurd that

this Court could conceivably consider appellant's
argument as serious that unclean hands is a
defense where the appellant has the mistaken
belief that he can blame others for his unlawful
conduct.

The objective of allowing unclean hands

as a defense in a civil case appears reasonable
since the plaintiff, against whom the defendant
must assert the defense, is generally seeking
damages.

In the present criminal action, however,

the respondent shouldered the burden of proving
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
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a higher burden eliminating the need for any
equitable defenses. Moreover, the focus in any
criminal action is solely upon the conduct of the
defendant.

The obvious defense in such an action,

whether through direct evidence or cross-examination,
must create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jurors that the defendant did not commit the crime.
Where the prosecution presents evidence tending
to establish the defendant's guilt, it is for the
jury to weigh the evidence in the defendant's case.
Furthermore, instructing the jury as to unclean
hands may improperly work to the appellant's own
disadvantage by incriminating him through the
conduct of others. Not only is such incrimination
forbidden in a criminal case, but also by presenting
the instruction the jurors could conceivably become
confused by being instructed on the one hand to
consider solely the conduct of the appellant, and on
the other hand to consider the conduct of the victims.
Second, the evidence in the present case
shows that an instruction on unclean hands is completely unwarranted.

At the most, the appellant

contends that the victims were aware of the appellant 's scheme during the "wash trades" or "float trades;11
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The respondent demonstrates sufficiently in the
Statement of Facts and under Point IV that such a
conclusion is unreasonable (T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81,
82, 110, 223). However, even if the victim's
know of the appellant's scheme, mere knowledge
certainly cannot rise to the level of actual participation in the defendants unlawful conductr
Furthermore, the level of such participation
must of necessity be higher than that civilly
required since the action is actually brought on
behalf of the whole of society rather than a
single plaintiff or group of plaintiffsv
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED VARIOUS
TYPES OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING APPELLANT'S UNLAWFUL
INTENT AND SCHEME TO DEFRAUD BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE
WAS RELEVANT, MATERIAL AND NOT PREJUDICAL TO
APPELLANT'S CASE.
The appellant claims that certain evidence
was improperly admitted in the present case for
two reasons.

First, appellant claims that evidence

concerning potential mergers of the Great Northern
Corporation, personal loans he acquired for payment of stock, and losses suffered by victims and
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non-victims prior to initiation of the scheme to
defraud, was irrelevant, remote, immaterial and
prejudicial.

Second appellant claims that

evidence with respect to conversations of Robert
Shields, provisionally admitted on the grounds that
Shields would subsequently be shown to be an agent
of appellant, was hearsay and inadmissible.

Respon-

dent contends, however, that such evidence was
admissible to prove appellant's intent and unlawful
conduct in this complex scheme to defraud.
Generally, evidence which shows acts similar
to those of the appellant in the present case has
been freely admitted by fedeoaL courts.

In United

States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 946 (2nd Cir. 1961),
where seven defendants were charged with using a
plan

which resulted in the defendants "purchasing"

control of a corporation by using its own funds,
and thereby defrauding the other stockholders,
the court held that transactions prior to the fraudulent transaction, although not pleaded in the indictment, were relevant and not prejudicial.

The court

held that such transactions showed an early
connection between defendants; they indicated a known
falsity; they were relevant to one of the defendant's
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knowledge of the falsity of the reputation; and
they were highly relevant to the issue of criminal
intent and knowing complicity in the fraud.

Moreover,

in United States v. Livengood, 427 F.2d 420, 424
(9th Cir0 1970), a director indicted under § 17(a)
for selling debentures, claimed remoteness in that
the trial court erred in permitting evidence of
defendants actions two years before the company
defaulted on the debentures.

The court, however,

held that although evidence of his kind was damaging
and prejudicial, it was relevant and hence not
erroneously admittedc

The court noted that during

the time both defendants were cooperating together
in a scheme to defraud investorst they "boosted"
the corporation to one victim, and they participated
in attempting to convince investors in a reorganization plan after the corporation failed to meet its
obligations.

Furthermore, in United States v. Dardi,

330 F.2d 316, 332 (2nd Cir. 1964) f where the president and three broker-dealers of a large corporation
were convicted of conspiring to sell unregistered
stock to the public, the court held that there was
no merit in the contention that the appellants were
prejudiced by the testimony of the unfortunate
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purchasers of the corporation's stock, and such
testimony was relevant to numerous counts of the
indictment.
In connection with the above federal standards,
it is clear that evidence in the present case concerning prior transactions, personal loans, and
losses suffered by the victims of this
fraud, is admissible.

"Relevant

securities

evidence" is

defined in Rule 1(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
to mean "evidence having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove the existence of any material
fact."

Nearly all of the evidence which appellant

claims was improperly admitted is relevant to
the issue of appellant1s intent to defraud.
Possible mergers of Great Northern and the existence
of loans are directly related to the nature of the
shell corporation and the appellant's intent to
make the corporation appear to be of substantial
substance.

In addition, such evidence was relevant

to increased market activity in Great Northern's
stock which was a specific link in appellant's
scheme to defraud.

Also, although this conduct

occurs prior to the acts alleged in the indictment,
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it is all part of the preliminary preparation of
appellant's scheme, and therefore not remote.
Prejudice, which appellant claims occurred as
a result of the admission of this evidence,
must be distinguished from relevant, material
evidence outlining the purposes behind appellant's
specific unlawful conduct.
Appellant's claim of inadmissible hearsay
can also be rejected upon several grounds. First,
Rule 63(9) (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows:
"As against a party, a statement
which would be admissible if made by the
declarant at the hearing if . . . ( b )
the party and the declarant were
participating in a plan to commit
a crime or a civil wrong and the
statement was relevant to the plan or
its subject matter and was made while
the plan was in existence and before
its complete execution or other
terminationc * ." . .
Appellant's rejection of the vicarious admission
exception to the hearsay rule assumes that the
statements were declared after'the execution of
the scheme.

However, respondent has shown and

adequately demonstrates under Point IV of this
brief that the scheme was in existence at the
time of the statements0
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Second, Shields1 statements were authorized
under Rule 63(8) , since Shields was persuaded to
become a participant in appellant's scheme.

Shields

allowed the appellant to use his account and this
fact was attested to not only by Shields, but also
by the purchasing brokerage houses (T. 28, 86#
339-341)o

In addition, Shields used appellant's

checks written by appellant's wife and this fact
was also confirmed not only by Shields, but by
the purchasing brokerage houses (T. 27-28, 86,
341-43).

Moreover, Shields worked with the

appellant in a business manned by acquiring and
making various substantial loans to the appellant.
Third, statements of design or plan are in
general admissible so far as the design or plan
is relevant to show the doing of the act designed.
IV Wigmore on Evidence § 1732 (3d. ed. 1940).
However, even if this Court should decide
that the trial court improperly admitted certain
evidence, this court is required to render judgment without regard to errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
As part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), states:
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"After hearing an appeal the court
must give judgment without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.
If error has been committed, it shall
not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it has that effect before
it is warranted in reversing the
judgment«"
In State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929
(1973), this Court held that in order to interfere
with a jury verdict, the error must be such that
it was reasonably probable that there would have
been a result more favorable to the defendant in
the absence of error.

In the present case the

record compels the conclusion that the asserted
errors were insignificant and in no way resulted
in prejudice to the defendant's case.

See also

State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P.2d 491
(1970).
This result was applied in a criminal
securities prosecution in Farrell v. United States,
supra, at 419, where the appellant's were charged
with a violation of § 17(a)(1) in that they created
a plan designed as a secured 10% earnings program.
The Court held that the fact that some evidence may
have gotten into the record by investor witnesses
who had not received their investments back, did
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not constitute a prejudicial error sufficient to
warrant a reversal.

The court went on to hold that it

is to be presumed that the jury heeded the instruction of the court and that any error in the admission
of such evidence was cured by the cautionary instruction.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY BECAUSE REASONABLE MINDS
COULD BELIEVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
APPELLANT, IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFER, SALE OR
PURCHASE OF SECURITIES, EMPLOYED A DEVICE, SCHEME,
OR ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD.
The rules governing the scope of appellate
review as to sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal
case to sustain the verdict are well settled:

It

is for the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses
and determine the facts; evidence will be reviewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict; and if
when so viewed it appears the jury acting fairly and
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed*
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959).
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Reasonable doubt is described as follows:
11

'Reasonable doubt' is not a mere
imaginary, captious, or a possible doubt,
but a fair doubt, based upon reason and
common sense, and growing out of testimony
in the case, and it is such doubt as
will leave juror*s mind, after a careful examination of all evidence, in such
condition that he cannot say he has an
abiding conviction, to a moral certaintyf
of defendant's guilt." State v, Taylor,
21 Utah 2d 425, 446 P.2d 954 (1968).
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957),
cert. den. 355 U.S. 848, 78 S.Ct. 74, 2 L.Ed.2d 57
further adds:

". . *proof beyond all peradventure of

doubt could seldom be had, nor does the law require
it."
Respondent contends that the evidence
presented by the State in the trial recordf viewed
under the above standards, is more than adequate to
support the jury's verdict of guilty.
•:•••••• Because of the nature of the crime, stock
fraud is rarely proved by a single specific act
of the appellant.

The inference of guilt in most

instances must be drawn from several indicia of
fraud which collectively tend to incriminate the
appellant.
The appellant's unlawful conduct consisted
of a series of several simple but deceptive transactions which collectively constituted a complex
scheme designed to defraud investors.

First, the
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nominee accounts at

eight brokerage houses in the names of individuals
who had no knowledge of transactions conducted
therein and no knowledge of the scheme to defraud
(T. 37-38, 308-309, 315, 317, 321, 323). Other
accounts were also established by the appellant
(T. 38).
Second, the defendant caused the stock of
Great Northern Corporation, Silver Gull Corporation,
and West Am Corporation to be bought and sold,
thus creating an artificial market activity and price
in these stocks.

The purpose of creating this artificial

market activity and price was to obtain money from other
persons, including several brokerage houses (T. 39, 74,
155, 223, 228, 294-296).

This conclusion is evidenced

by the fact that the market in the stock collapsed when
the appellant executed all the buy and sell orders at
the same time, and by the fact that the appellant's
purchases of stock immediately after expressing an
interest in the company caused a significant impact
on the market rise (T.71, 91, 158, 179, 388, 402,
413, 484).
Third, the defendant through his agents purchased
certain amounts of stock of Great Northern Corporation, Silver Gull Corporation, and West Am
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Corporation in the various nominee accounts and,
at the same time, sold the same amount of stock
at Continental also in various nominee accountsc
Under this "wash trade" or "float trade" the
purchased stocks were paid for by the brokerage
firms where the stock was purchased, and, unknown
to the purchasing firms, the proceeds which were
delivered to Continental were actually delivered
to the appellant (T. 26, 36, 55, 68, 81, 82, 110,
233, 241).
Fourth, the appellant, on the accounts of
Barbara Facer and William Birkinshaw, caused checks
to be issued to the brokerage firms where the stocks
had been purchased, and the checks were all drawn
against insufficient funds, causing an aggregate
loss of over $150^000, all of which remained unpaid
(T, 40) •
Fifth, the appellant intentionally employed
a scheme to defraud by intentionally establishing
nominee accounts, creating artificial market activity,
and price in the stocks, conducting "wash trades" or
"float trades/1 receiving the proceeds from such
trades, and writing checks against insufficient funds
for the purpose of deceiving unknowing investors *
The possibility of any other reasonable hypothesis
being foreclosed,
jury
was
justified
in concluding,
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as they did, that the appellant intentionally employed
a scheme to defraud.
The above rules governing the scope of appellate
review as to sufficiency of the evidence are especially
applicable following a verdict of stock fraud.

In

United States v. Dardi, supra, the court noted the
following concerning sufficiency of the evidence:
"Because a large portion of the
errors asserted by appellants are
bottomed on . . . sufficiency of proof,
it is appropriate to advert to certain
long established principles of appellate
review. A jury of twelve has heard all
the testimony, explanations of the
meaning of a vast number of exhibits, and
the exhaustive summations of counsel, and
has been instructed on the applicable legal
rules. Their verdict, after due consideration, was that appellants were, on the facts
and the law, guilty of substantive crimes
and of conspiracy. It was within the
exclusive domain of the jury to choose
between competing inferences of fact,
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
563 (2d Cir. 1956), revfd on other grounds,
353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931
(1957). On appeal the evidence must be
considered in a light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Tutino,
269 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1959). Moreover,
miscroscopic dissection of bits and pieces
of evidence when laid out in a cold record
overlooks the truism that 'logically the sum
is often greater than the aggregate of the
parts, and the cumulation of instances * * *
may have a probative force immensely greater
than any one of them alone.1 United States
v. White, 124 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1941)."
330 F.2d at 325.
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Also, in United States v, Dukow, 330 F.Supp. 360,
362-63 (W.D. Pa, 1971), the major stockholder and president
of Champion Industries, Incc, a paper corporation with no
substantial assets, was convicted of participating in a scheme
or artifice to defraud the investors of Champion under Section
17(a)«

The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, and,

in the alternative, for a new trial, on the grounds of
insufficiency of evidence.

The court denied both motions

and held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding by the jury of a scheme or artifice to defraud
investors, even though Dukow made no sales personally, since
schemes to defraud may be sustained on circumstantial evidence
alone.

The evidence showed that Dukow was the principal

link between Champion and CBC, an over-the-counter brokerage
firm, and both knew of the lurking dangers of certain outstanding notes which could have caused repossession of the
paper plant, Champion's poor financial status, and nebulous
prospects for acquisitions * but never revealed this information to investors.
The thrust of the appellant's argument focuses
on the legality of specific acts within the scheme. However,
as the court in Dardi noted above, the appellant should not
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be allowed to dissect his conduct into small lawful transactions.

The statute speaks in terms of a "scheme" to

defraud and the putting together of otherwise legal acts
to formulate an illegal act is no less unlawful than
committing a single unlawful act.

Clearly this court

should not require that respondent prove that every
single act was in itself a violation of the statute.
Furthermore, even if more than one reasonable
inference could be drawn from the evidence, this
Court has stated that "where different reasonable inferences
can be drawn from the evidence, the question is one exclusively
within the providence of the jury."
Utah 63, 157 P«2d 258 (1945).

State v. Thatcher, 108

The evidence being more

than adequate to sustain the findings of fact arrived at by
the jury, this Court should be very reluctant to overturn
that jury verdict.
The jury had sufficient basis from the evidence
presented at trial to find the defendant guilty of stock
fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.

This Court should

therefore sustain the verdict and judgment of the trial
court.

-35-
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CONCLUSION
Because instructions to the jury with respect
to the element of reliance and the unclean hands defense
are not required in a criminal securities fraud prosecution
and because sufficient and proper evidence was admitted by
the trial court, and any errors that may have been committed
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt/ respondent respectfully submits that appellants request for a reversal of the
conviction and sentence and dismissal of the charges or, in
the alternative, remand for a new trial, be denied and that
the verdict and judgment of the jury at the trial be affirmed*
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
STEPHEN R. RANDLE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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